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Abstract
All around the world, population aging has spurred developed countries to reform
their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and re-
ducing the generosity of pension beneﬁts have been widely implemented changes. In
this paper we assess how successful those policies can be in the case of the Spanish
economy, and compare with the results obtained by the already implemented reforms
(1997 and 2001). This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agents, applied
general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in re-
sponse to changes in pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce
the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (specially the pattern of early retire-
ment induced by minimum pensions). We then use to model to explore the impact
of pension reforms. We ﬁnd that already implemented changes actually increase the
implicit liabilities of the system, while delaying the legal retirement age to 68 may
roughly halve the size of the current pension debt.
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Population aging and the fast approaching retirement of the large cohorts of baby-boomers
has cast considerable doubts about the ﬁnancial viability of current Pay As You Go
(PAYG) pension systems. It is widely agreed that providing future retirees with bene-
ﬁts of similar size to that enjoyed by current generations can only come at the expense
of large increases in future payroll taxes. This would demand a very large eﬀort from
future taxpayers, putting the intergenerational contract in jeopardy. As a result, most
industrialized countries have made attempts to reform their pension systems, targeting
lower beneﬁts and higher labor participation by their more senior workers.1
In this paper we explore the ability of these reforms to enhance the ﬁnancial prospects
of PAYG pensions systems over the next few decades. This is undertaken via simulation
in an heterogeneous-agents, large-scale, neoclassical growth model with overlapping gen-
erations (OLG) and endogenous retirement ages. This model is calibrated to reproduce
the demographic process, pension system details and macroeconomic aggregates of the
Spanish economy. After checking its ability to reproduced observed retirement patterns,
the model is used to simulate the impact of recent reforms in pension rules.
By now there is a rather large literature using applied general equilibrium models to
explore pension issues. However, the speciﬁc topic of pension reform under unfavorable
demographics has been the subject of only a small number of papers. Auerbach, Kotlikoﬀ,
Hagemann, and G. Nicoletti (1989) and De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Sargent (1999) stand
out as the closest to our target. Both papers focus on the eﬀects of reductions in pension
beneﬁts and increases in the mandatory retirement age. They ﬁnd a substantial positive
role for the reforms, in terms of the size of the expected ﬁscal adjustment and of the welfare
of future generations (largely obtained at the expense of damaging older cohorts). There
are, however, some aspects of this previous literature that are not entirely satisfactory. In
the ﬁrst place, real world governments cannot directly determine the workers’ retirement
age. In general, they can only aﬀect individual behavior indirectly, by changing the incen-
tives implicit in the pension rules. By limiting to changes in mandatory retirement ages,
the previous literature has left unanswered the question of whether governments can ac-
tually delay eﬀective retirement ages by changing the pension rules. Secondly, reductions
in the pension generosity can decrease the opportunity cost of working at advanced ages,
and therefore foster later retirement. As early retirees are typically more expensive to the
pension system than the normal ones, this side eﬀect can reinforce the positive impact of
generosity reductions on the Social Security accounts. This issue has not been addressed in
the previous simulations, which assume a mandatory retirement age and pay no attention
to the existence of early retirement. The endogenous response of retirement to pension
reform is considered in Kenc and Perraudin (1997a) partial equilibrium analysis of the
1See Caseay et al. (2003) for updated projections on ﬁscal imbalances in OECD countries, and Kalisch








 distortions induced by the diﬀerent pieces of the pension regulations. The general equilib-
rium version of the paper (Kenc and Perraudin (1997b)), however, assumes exogenously
ﬁxed retirement ages.2
In this paper we allow individuals to decide when to stop working and collect the pen-
sion beneﬁts, and study the eﬀectiveness of policies aimed at delaying retirement. We also
account for the indirect behavioral eﬀects of generosity reductions, as those implemented
in 1997 and 2001. We consider two possible extensions to those already implemented re-
forms: (i) larger generosity reductions, engineered through changes in the length of the
averaging period in the pension formula; and (ii) delays in the system’s Normal retire-
ment age. These institutional changes are explored in a neoclassical economy featuring a
detailed representation of public pension rules, intra-cohort diﬀerences in labor earnings
and hours worked, realistic inﬂows of overseas workers and imperfect credit and annuities
markets. Borrowing constraints at the end of the life cycle are implemented by extend-
ing the rigorous characterization of savings under life uncertainty in Leung (2000) to the
analysis of optimal retirement in Crawford and Lilien (1981) and Fabel (1994).
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: First, it is crucial to model minimum
pensions and labor income heterogeneity to successfully reproduce the basic stylized facts
of retirement in Spain. Second, the reforms implemented so far have failed to improve
the ﬁnancial prospects of the Spanish pension system. Changes introduced in 2001 have
actually made things worse by increasing the tendency to early retirement. In its current
form the pension system would run into deﬁcit from 2020 onwards, and the imbalance
will peak around 2045, at a ﬁgure larger than 10% of the GDP. In contrast, the proposed
additional reforms are quite eﬀective: (i) increasing the legal retirement age make most
workers willing to stay in the labor force until more advanced ages, while (ii) accounting for
the full working history when computing the pension beneﬁt makes the system signiﬁcantly
less generous. Although this makes some workers retire later, the reform signiﬁcantly
reduces the overall size of the liabilities of the system. The size of this implicit debt
is, however, still rather large, adding up to around 70% of the GDP after either reform.
Finally, the inter-generational welfare eﬀects of the reforms are quite similar to those
already found in the previous literature. We contribute some new results about the key role
played by the minimum pensions on the intra-generational welfare eﬀects of the reforms.
Note that, although these speciﬁc quantitative results only apply to the Spanish case,
2Kenc and Perraudin (1997b) explores the eﬀects of an alignment in pension rules across some major
European countries. Kenc and Perraudin also assume a stable population structure and avoid looking
into the impact of demographic changes. The Spanish case is explored in Conesa and Garriga (2003),
where the abolition of public pensions is accompanied by the lifting of the obligation to retire at the age
of 65. Although the authors refer to this as “endogenous retirement”, individuals in their model take no
participation decision. The papers also diﬀer in the reproduction of the details of the pension rules and
of the empirical patterns of retirement, and on the general scope of the reforms (in Conesa and Garriga









 the general qualitative picture obtained from our simulation is probably similar for other
countries with similar pension systems (like, eg. Italy, Germany or France).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the basic empirical patterns
of labor supply at advanced ages in Spain, and discuss their interactions with the public
pension rules. The model is describe in section 3, calibrated to the Spanish economy in
section 4 and simulated in a number of institutional settings in section 5. The paper
ﬁnishes with some concluding comments and suggestions for future research in section 6.
2 Pension rules and the labor supply of older workers
In this section we review the basic labor supply patterns of older workers in Spain focusing
on the interaction between pension rules and retirement behavior. This analysis provides
the rationale for our modeling choices in section 3. We start with a brief review of Old
Age pension rules in Spain.
2.1 Old Age pension regulations in Spain
The system is ﬁnanced with contributions paid by current active workers, ie. it is run on
a PAYG basis.3 Contributions are a ﬁxed proportion of gross labor income between an
upper and a lower limit (contribution bases), which are annually ﬁxed and vary according
with the professional category. Fifteen years of contributions and the complete withdrawal
from the labor force are needed to be entitled to receive a pension.4
The initial pension is worked out by multiplying a regulatory base and a replacement
rate. The regulatory base is a moving average of the contribution bases in the 15 years
immediately before retirement (8 before the 1997 reform). The replacement rate depends
on the age and the number of years of contributions. An individual is granted a 100%
of the regulatory base if he retires at the age of 65 (Normal retirement age, τN) having
contributed for more than 35 years. It is possible to start collecting the pension at the
age of 60 (Early retirement age, τm) under a 35% penalty on the regulatory base. This
corresponds to a 7% (8% for workers with a short contribution record) annual penalty for
anticipating the retirement age. There is also a penalty for insuﬃcient contributions if
the length of the working career is less than 35. In that case, a 2% reduction is applied
to the regulatory base for every year the individual’s contribution record is below that
number. The real value of the initial beneﬁt is kept constant according to the evolution
3We focus on the General Regime (RGSS), the cornerstone of the Spanish Social Security system. In
2006 76% of aﬃliated workers were contributing to this scheme, though a number of Special Schemes
were still in place. Reforms starting in 1997 have targeted a rationalization of the system, including the
progressive elimination of the Special Regimes, with the exception of the one for Self-employed workers.
4Minor changes in the entitlement conditions and the pension formula were introduced in January 2002.




















Figure 1: Conditional retirement probability by age: total population (–), workers receiv-
ing minimum pensions (- -) and workers who do not receive minimum pensions (·). Source:
Historiales Laborales de Seguridad Social (HLSS), 1995
of the Retail Price Index. There are upper and lower limits on the pension beneﬁt, which
are annually ﬁxed by the government.
2.2 Labor supply patterns of older workers and their economic inter-
pretation
Figure 1 makes clear that most workers withdraw from the labor force either at the early
retirement age or at the normal retirement age. This is a very robust empirical pattern,
repeatedly observed across countries with similar PAYG, Deﬁned Beneﬁt (DB) pension
systems.5 To explore the composition of these ﬂows according to labor earnings, ﬁgure 2
presents a non-parametric estimation of the retirement hazard as a function of the level of
labor income at the age of 60, for some selected ages. It shows that, while the probability
of leaving the labor force is unaﬀected by the salary level at the normal retirement age,
it is clearly decreasing at the early retirement age. By splitting the sample according to
5Our data come from a sub-sample of administrative records from the Spanish Social Security (HLSS).
This database is described in detail in Boldrin, Jim´ enez, and Peracchi (1999). Similar patterns are found
in other databases and in cross-country comparisons of retirement hazards. Gruber and Wise (1999) or
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Figure 2: Retirement hazard at the age of 60 (top panels) and 65 (bottom panels) as a function of
the wage level at the age of 60, for workers of high (left panels) and low (right panels) education.
The educational level is approximated by the social security contribution group. Source: HLSS,
1995 sample.
the social security group of contribution, we can appreciate that the previous patterns are
essentially independent of the worker educational achievement. Most early retirees are,
then, low income workers who qualify for a top-up of their pensions under the minimum
pension scheme. Actually, 67.7% of the people who retire at the exact age of 60 are
receiving the guaranteed minimum, or are expecting to receive it at some future point of
their life-cycle.
The stylized facts just described can be rationalized as a set of rational responses to
the incentives provided by the pension regulations. This can be easily showed by reviewing
the impact of pension rules in the marginal beneﬁts and costs of working.6 An individual
who decide to stay in the labor force at any age τ, faces two marginal costs: a reduction
in the amount of leisure, and the ﬁnancial cost of the foregone pension beneﬁt (if his age
is advance enough to be entitled to it). At the same time, by staying active the worker
receives a ﬂow of labor income and changes (typically increases) the pension beneﬁt he/she
is entitled to receive in the future. In Spain, this latter eﬀect depends on two elements.
First, postponing retirement in the age range {τm,...,τ N} reduces the early retirement
penalty (and the penalty for insuﬃcient contributions, if his working career is shorter than








 35). Secondly, the regulatory base changes as current gross earnings substitutes for the
value recorded 15 years back in time. Notice that while the former element always results
in a higher beneﬁt, the latter may have the opposite eﬀect (as a result of the concavity of
the life cycle proﬁle of gross labor income).
Keeping all this in mind, it is not diﬃcult to explain the discontinuities in retirement
hazard by age. The age-65 peak is the optimal answer to (1) the lack of any further rise
in the replacement rate of the regulatory base after the normal retirement age, (2) the
drop in the regulatory base induced by the concavity of the income proﬁles and (3) the
high opportunity cost represented by the penalty-free pension when compared with the
relatively low wages prevailing at those ages. Notice that the combination of (1) and (2)
implies that anyone postponing retirement after the age of 65 can only expect lower future
pension beneﬁts.
Early retirement patterns are easily rationalized as an artifact ofthe minimum guar-
anteed beneﬁt. As the value of the minimum is completely independent of the individual
characteristics, it entirely eliminates the incentive eﬀects stemming from the pension for-
mula. In particular, it increases the opportunity cost of the foregone pension and wipes
out the strong incentives to work associated with the early retirement penalties. As work-
ing an additional year does not increase the minimum pension, the best strategy for the
aﬀected workers is to leave the labor force as soon as the pension is ﬁrst available. All in
all, our conjecture is that the basic empirical regularities may be satisfactory explained
as the rational reply to the non-linearities induced by the pension rules on the individual
inter-temporal budget constraint.7.
The rationale for our main modeling choices
We conclude from the evidence presented so far that an endogenous retirement age is an
important element for any model intended for analyzing the type of reforms we focus on in
this paper. This is obvious in the case of reforms explicitly designed to delay retirement,
but it is also important in the case of changes in the pension formula targeting generosity
reductions. The bias induced by omitting the behavioral reply in this latter case is po-
tentially important, because early retirees receiving minimum pensions are substantially
more expensive than normal retirees (as conﬁrmed later, by comparing the internal rates
of return obtained when retiring at diﬀerent ages). Reproducing the empirical retirement
p a t t e r na l s od e m a n d sad e t a i l e dr e p r o d u c t i o no ft h ep e n s i o nr u l e sa n dt h ei n c l u s i o no f
intra-cohort income heterogeneity as part of the model speciﬁcation.
7This conclusion is also supported by the results in a large body of empirical an econometric literature
(see for example Diamond and Gruber (1999) Rust and Phelan (1997) for the USA and Boldrin, Jim´ enez,








 3 The model
The model consists of overlapping generations of agents that live up to I periods. A
period in the model stands for one year of real time, which we denote by t when referring
to calendar time and by i when referring to age. The cohort the individual belongs to
is denoted by u. Individuals start taking economic decisions at the age of entrance in
the labor market (20 years). At that time individuals are classiﬁed according to their
educational attainment in one of J possible categories (denoted by j ∈J= {1,...,J}).8
The description of the model demands substantial notation which, for easy reference,
is collected in tables 1 (endogenous variables) and 2 (parameters). As a general rule,
individual variables are written in lower case with a couple of subscripts and a superscript
representing age, education and calendar year. Aggregate variables are denoted with
capital letters and have just one superscript indicating calendar time.
3.1 Demographic Model
We model a one sex population were individuals are classiﬁed according to their birth
place as “Natives”, Nt, or “Migrants”, Mt. The number of people born at t is determined
by the proﬁle of age-speciﬁc fertility rates {θt
i} (assumed to vary between the threshold

















i 1 <i≤ I (2)
where Ft
i stands for immigrants ﬂows and {hsu
i }I
i=1 for cohort-u vector of age-conditional
survival probabilities. Equations (1) and (2) can be combined to represent the entire
population dynamics at any point in time as a system of linear diﬀerence equations:
P








This is the law of motion of the population in the interval t ∈ (t0,t 1), a stage of
demographic transition in which fertility and mortality parameters are changing in time
(see section 4.1). After t1 the economy progressively converges to a stable population, and
in the very long run we simply assume that the economy reaches a balanced growth path.9
The complete time span of the simulation is represented by T .
8We abstract from schooling and labor market entrance decisions. It is not diﬃcult to let the distribution
by education, ω
u
j , change with the cohort (according with empirical evidence), but we have opted to keep
it constant to assess the eﬀects of pension reform in isolation. The distribution by education within a
cohort is also assumed to be constant.
9The long run convergence is achieved in two steps. We assume that after t
1 (set to 2050 in the














Gross labor income ilt





Revenues form bequests BIt Product Y t
Fiscal Income FIt Capital stock Kt
Lump-sum tax ϕt Labor Supply Lt
Minimum pension bmt Pension Expenditure PPt
Public Consumption CPt Pension System balance PSBt
Technology index At
Population Prices
Total Pt Wage wt
Natives/Inmigrants Nt,M t Rental capital rt
Distribution µt
i,j
Table 1: List of endogenous variables in the model. The counters used are: i ∈{ 1,...,I}
for individual age; t ∈T for calendar year, u for cohort (year of birth) and j for educational
type.
Population Public policy
Age speciﬁc fertility rate θ t
i Pay-roll tax rate ςt
Conditional survival probability hsu
i Number of years in beneﬁt base D
Immigrant ﬂows F t
i,j Early entitlement age τm
Population growth rate nt Normal retirement age τN
Leisure li Early retirement penalties α(τ)
Eﬃciency labor units εij Minimum pension (% y) b m
Distribution by education ωj Public Consumption (% Y) c p
Preferences Technology
Relative risk aversion η Depreciation rate δ
Time discount factor β Capital share (on National Income) ζ
Relative leisure value σ Exogenous productivity growth rate ρ








 3.2 Economic Model
We use the standard neoclassical growth model extended with life uncertainty, borrowing
constraints at the end of the life cycle and ﬂows of workers from abroad. At the aggregate
level the economy is deterministic, while at the micro level individuals are uncertain about
the length of their life. There is no insurance market for this risk, as annuity markets are
closed by assumption.
The Public Sector
The main role played by the Public Sector is to run a PAYG, DB social security system.
After contributing a ﬁxed proportion, ς, of their gross labor income, workers become
elegible for a pension beneﬁt during retirement. The pension can be claimed at any time
after the early retirement age, τm, an following a complete withdrawal from the labor
force. The initial pension for an individual belonging to cohort u and retired at age τ is









i stands for the gross labor income at age i and calendar year t. The formula
combines a regulatory base (averaging gross labor earnings in the D years immediately
before retirement) and a replacement rate 0 <α (τ) ≤ 1 that penalizes retirement before





α0 < 1i f τ<τ m
α0 + α1(τ − τm) < 1i f τ ∈{ τm,...,τ N − 1}
1i f τ ≥ τN
(6)
This initial pension is kept constant in real terms as the individual becomes older. How-
ever, the eﬀective pension can eventually increase as a result of the minimum pension:
the unique guaranteed minimum set by the government on a year by year basis (denoted
bmt). In the past, it has been common practice to increase its real value roughly at the
same pace as wages. Consequently, the eﬀective pension income for an individual of age i
in t and retired at age τ is given by:
ibt
i(τ)=max{bmt,b (τ,t− i +1 ) } (7)
After t
2 = t






and we assume convergence to a ﬁnal balance growth path at some point well after t
2 (2220 in the current
calibration). We check that this ﬁnal value do not aﬀect the performance of the economy in the interval
of interest (t0,t 1).
10We abstract from some minor pieces of the Spanish pension regulation, in an attempt to get a sharper
characterization of the eﬀects of the most determinant ones. In particular, we omit the ﬂoor and ceilings








 In addition to running the pension system, the Public Sector performs two functions:
it runs a ﬁscal system and consumes a certain amount, CPt, of the aggregate output. In
our model, ﬁscal revenue comes from the conﬁscation of involuntary bequests and from a
system of lump sum taxes.11 The policy rule is to set the annual per-capita tax ϕt in such
a way that the entire public budget (including the pension system) balances.
The production side of the economy
We assume a neoclassical technology, F(K,L), with constant returns to scale, no adjust-
ment costs and exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress (represented by the
index At). The growth rate of the labor productivity, ρ, is constant. As usual, we assume
that this technology is run by a large number of proﬁt-maximizing, competitive ﬁrms.
The Households
Agents in the model maximize their expected lifetime utility by choosing an optimal sav-
ings path and a “once and for all” retirement age. Formally, individuals of type j belonging
to cohort u choose a retirement age, τu




i=1, that maximize the sum of expected, discounted utility












where β stands for a pure discount factor while su
i is the unconditional probability of
surviving till age i for a member of the cohort u. The fraction of the time endowment
allocated to market activities,(1 − lij), is assumed to be ﬁxed exogenously12.
11The problem here is that using taxes to balance the public budget has the unintended eﬀect of making
the assessment of pension reform harder. Whenever the ﬁnancial condition of the pension system is altered
(eg after a legislative change), the tax rate should be adjusted accordingly. With a non-neutral tax system,
this implies an additional distortion on behavior, whose eﬀects should be separately accounted for when
evaluating the impact of the pension reform. We have, in any case, checked that the qualitative outcome
of the model with a proportional income tax is very similar to that under a system of lump-sum taxes. Of
course, the quantitative ﬁndings are diﬀerent, but the changes are small. We report the results obtained
under a non-distorsionary tax system, then, only for expositional convenience.
12Including an endogenous working-hours decision results in a strong counterfactual prediction: hours
worked late in the life cycle should jump in order to accumulate additional pension rights. This is a direct
outcome of the short averaging period in the pension formula. There is, however, not a trace of such a
behavior in the Spanish data. This most certainly reﬂects the existence of institutional constraints that
prevents workers from implementing their optimal life cycle proﬁles of hours worked. Legal limits in the
number of overtime hours and other restrictive dispositions stemming from the Collective Bargaining are
most likely behind this rigidity in the Spanish labor market. Although some of the reforms we study
in this paper are due to modify the optimal amount of hours worked, we have opted for keeping them
constant throughout the simulations. Making them endogenous is not specially diﬃcult (eg. S´ anchez-
Mart´ ın (2002)) but that will amount to assume a future weakening of the institutional constrains that








 While the individual is active in the labor market, the relevant budget constraint is:
cu+i−1
ij + au+i
i+1j =( 1− ς)ilu+i−1
ij +( 1+ru+i−1)au+i−1
ij − ϕu+i−1 (8)
where rt stands for the return on savings carried to year t and ilt
ij is gross labor income
at age i and calendar time t. This is the product of the number of hours worked, the
productivity of time at that speciﬁc age and date (εt
ij), and the current market value of





j ) + (1 + ru+i−1)au+i−1
i − ϕu+i−1 (9)
Pension income ibu+i−1
ij (τu
j ) is computed according to expressions (5) to (7). Finally,
individuals are not allowed to borrow from their future pension ﬂows, which is equivalent
to a nonnegative constraint on the value of the stock of assets at any age after retirement.
This constraint always becomes binding before the maximum lifespan (Leung (2000)).
Consequently, the numerical solution of the model involves ﬁnding another discrete variable




An equilibrium path over the time interval T is a set of time series of population (aggregates
and distributions), assignments (consumption, savings and retirement), aggregate inputs,
prices and public policies (taxes, minimum pensions and public consumption) with the
standard properties: individuals are rational, factor markets clear, prices are competitive,
the public budget balances and all assignments are feasible. Appendix A-1 provides a
formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium of the model economy. As in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987), the equilibrium is completed with a ﬁnal balance-growth steady state (to which the
equilibrium path converges) and an initial steady state from where all the initial conditions
are taken.13 The initial and ﬁnal steady states are particular cases of the equilibrium path
above, were the population is stable and grows at a constant rate; aggregate variables
grow at a ﬁxed rate given by the sum of the population and productivity growth rates;
per capita variables and wages grow at the productivity growth rate and the interest rate
is constant.
13The set of initial conditions varies depending on the cohort. For very old individuals at t0 (which are
already retired when the simulation starts), it includes their initial pensions and assets. For cohorts of
workers close to retirement (ie, older than τ
u−D), it includes the assets and some of the salaries used in the
pension formula. For all the rest, the set of predetermined variables reduces to the stock of accumulated
assets. The more natural way of assigning those initial conditions is via direct measurement form empirical
data. Unfortunately, it is not possible to get a reliable estimation of the distribution of wealth by age and
education with the currently available Spanish databases. Therefore, we follow the standard procedure:
we obtain them from an initial steady state, calibrated to reproduce the economic environment prevailing









We calibrate our model economy to mimic the performance of the Spanish economy along
the interval 1970/2000 and in accordance with standard projections for future demographic
and productivity trends. Speciﬁcally, the properties that we want our model to show by
construction are:
(i) Demographic & immigration patterns should be consistent with the Spanish histor-
ical experience and with standard projections for the near future.
(ii) Pension rules should be consistent with Spanish Institutions.
(iii) The pension system’s ﬁnancial balance should match the empirical values at the
beginning of the simulation.14
(iv) Productivity & hours worked by educational level must be consistent with the em-
pirical evidence.
(v) The aggregate performance of the model should reproduce some key ratios of the
Spanish National Accounts.
(vi) Average retirement age should be aligned with that in the data.
4.1 Demographic patterns
A period in the model stands for one year of calendar time and we assume a maximum
lifespan I of 100 years. The simulated equilibrium path reproduces the population distri-
bution and the age proﬁles of fertility and survival probabilities observed in t0 = 2000.
From t0 to t1 = 2050 we simulate a changing pattern of fertility and mortality. The total
fertility rate (TFR) is assumed to recover from the extremely low values observed during
the nineties (1.2 children per women in 1995) to a ﬁnal stationary value of 1.75 in 2050. We
also reproduce the trend towards lower mortality rates by assuming that life expectancy
rises from the 79.7 years observed in 2000 to 84.0 years in 2050. These projections are
a bit more optimistic than the basic INE scenario (Spanish Statistics Institute “hip´ otesis
2” in INE (2001)). Finally, we estimate the aggregate number of immigrants and their
distribution by age in 1995, and assume a future input of workers from abroad similar to
that in the basic INE projection.15 Under these circumstances the share of immigrants in
the total population increases form 4.2 % in 2000 to 14.5 % in 2050.
14Note that we calibrate the balance of the system to the values observed on the onset of our simulation
rather than to 1970/2000 averages. This is important because the Spanish pension system is still converging
to a uniﬁed structure from a variety of disperse regimes. What we want to test in this paper is the capacity
of the ﬁnal design of the system to cope with the population aging.
15INE projection reproduces the very large aggregate ﬂows observed up to 2005 and conjectures a quick
convergence to more sustainable ﬁgures (slightly above one hundred thousand a year) by the end of the
decade. We correct the 2005 ﬁgure to include the amnesty granted to a large number of workers without








































POP. PYRAMIDS 2000 2040 (−−)
Figure 3: Population Projections: total and working population in millions (upper panels);
Total (-) and old age (- -) dependency ratios and population pyramids in 2000 (-) and 2040
(- -) (lower panels).
According to this model, the aging of the Spanish population in the next decades will
be quite dramatic. The main tendencies are displayed in ﬁgure 3. The projected total and
working population (upper panels of ﬁgure 3) are expected to start their decline within
the next two decades, although the precise timing and intensity of the reductions is very
sensitive to the assumptions about immigration. In contrast, the number of senior (older
than 65) citizens increases all along the simulation. Driven by these two simultaneous
forces, the dependency ratios soar: the ratio of retirees to active workers almost doubles
(29% to 55% from 2000 to 2050) while the total dependency ratio (including people under
20) increases from around 65% at the beginning of the simulation to 96% in 2050, a ﬁgure
quite close to the feared one-dependent-person-per-worker outcome (left bottom panel of
ﬁg 3). The drastic alteration in the overall age distribution of the population is best
given the historical experience in other European countries. Finally, note that the absence of reliable
empirical data makes it impossible to account for the diﬀerences between native and immigrants in terms








 captured by the change in the population pyramid (right bottom panel of ﬁg 3).
4.2 Economic model
The individual period utility is a separable CES function, with unitary intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES): u(ci,l i)=log(ci)+σlo g(li). The logarithm is adopted
in accordance with econometric evidence (Hurd (1989) for US or Jim´ enez-Mart´ ın and
S´ anchez-Mart´ ın (2003) for Spain) and to guarantee the invariance of the discrete decisions
in the ﬁnal balance growth path of the model. Individual preferences are, therefore, fully
speciﬁed by choosing σ and β. The production side of the economy is standard: capital
and eﬃcient labor units are combined according to a Cobb-Douglas production function
to generate aggregate output (ie, Y = Kζ L1−ζ). This part of the model is completely
speciﬁed by choosing the capital share in aggregate income ζ, the rate of capital depreci-
ation, δ, and the constant productivity growth rate, ρ. The government policies include (
apart from the pension formula and the contribution rate) the functions determining the
annual values of the minimum pension and public consumption. In both cases we choose
linear functions: we make the minimum pension proportional to the average productivity
(bmt = b myt), in broad agreement with the empirical evidence, while public consumption
is assumed to be a constant fraction, c p, of the aggregate product. Finally, we use smooth
quadratic curves to represent the age-proﬁles of productivity and working hours by edu-
cational type, and an additional set of J − 1 parameters to ﬁx the invariant distribution
by education. We try to reproduce the calibration targets (ii) to (vi) by imposing the
following speciﬁc values to the parameters above:
• Public pension system (ii): The parameters of the pension formula are
set to reproduce the General Regime (RGSS) of Spanish social security system.
Our benchmark case correspond to the structure in place before the 1997 reform.
Alternative pension formulae are described and studied in section 5.2. The parameter
determining the level of the minimum pension b m is ﬁxed to target the minimum-
to-average pension ratio in the interval 1980/1995 (77 %).
• Pension system’s ﬁnancial balance (iii): The contribution rate is set
in such a way that the model reproduces the imbalance of the pension system at
the beginning of the simulation. According to Herce (2002), pension expenditure
amounted to 9.28% of GDP in 2002, while contributions added up to a 10.17% of
GDP. Therefore, the calibration target is a surplus of 0.89% of the GDP at the
beginning of the simulation path, which is obtained by setting ς to 24.9%.16
16Although the model reproduces the magnitude of the system’s imbalance, it overstates the size of
both its revenues and expenditures. This is the unavoidable consequence of: (1) abstracting from some of
the RGSS rules (eg. maximum pensions and contributions); (2) the heterogeneity in the pension rules of




















Figure 4: Retirement hazard by age in the initial balanced growth path (-) and in the
data (- -) HLSS-95
Education ωj τj Jj(τ) tj(τ) IRRj
High 24.6 65 - 89 2.17
Average 49.2 65 79 89 1.80
Low 26.2 60 60 87 3.16
Table 3: Intra-generational distribution by education, ωj, and optimal discrete decisions in
the initial balanced-growth path: retirement ages τj, starting binding age for the minimum
pensions Jj(τ) and optimal binding age for the borrowing constraint tj(τ). The IRRj are








 Table 4: Macroeconomic calibration targets and parameter choices: Average 1970-1995
basic basic macroeconomic ratios according with the Spanish National Accounts, CNA86,
and their calibrated counterparts in the model, along with the implemented parameter
values.
data model parameters
rK/Y% 34.7 34.7 ζ = 0.347
K/Y 2.57 2.59 β= 0.983
I/Y% 23.6 23.4 δ = 0.064
CP/Y% 13.3 13.3 c p = 0.133
∆lnC%2 . 1 2 2 . 1 2 ρ =2 . 1 2
• Life cycle proﬁles by education (iv): The information about income, hours
worked and education is obtained from the 1994 cross section of the ECHP. In this
database we can precisely identify the life-cycle proﬁles of income and working-hours
of up to three educational levels (high (j=1), average (j=2) and low (j=3) ). Their
empirical distribution is presented in the second column of table 3.17 The smooth
quadratic curves ﬁtted to the empirical data have the usual concavity properties.18
• Macroeconomic aggregates (v): We choose β and δ to target the aver-
age capital/output and investment/output ratios respectively. ζ in the production
function is set to reproduce the average capital income share (as measured in Puig
and Licandro (1997)) while the exogenous productivity growth rate, ρ, is set to the
average growth rate of per capita consumption. Finally, the government expenditure
to output ratio is directly reﬂected in the parameter c p. All empirical values are
1970/1995 averages from the Spanish National Accounts (CNA86) with the excep-
contributions than in the RGSS (in the Self-employed Regime, for example, aﬃliates can choose the level
of their contributions independently of their income. A large part of this heterogeneity, however, is bound
to disappear with the progressive extinction of the old regimes after 1997); and, ﬁnally, (3) it also reﬂects
the absence of unemployment and non participation in the model.
17The distribution by education has been remarkably non-stationary in the last decades. In order to
reproduce the average behavior along our calibration interval, we include in the model the distribution for
the cohorts born between 1955 and 1975 (ie. individuals aged 40 years in 1994 or younger).
18As we abstract from unemployment or non participation, the age proﬁles of labor income and hours
worked by educational type correspond to the average proﬁles in the entire working-age population. We
ﬁrst estimate the participation rates and the proﬁles of hours worked by employees, according to age and
education. We then multiply them to get the empirical proﬁles of hours worked by age for each of our
educational types. A smoothed version of those proﬁles, ﬁtted by OLS, is ﬁnally included in the model. The
productivity proﬁles have been recovered in a similar way (we estimate the age proﬁle of labor income for
employed workers by education, compute the empirical proﬁles for our representative agents by weighting








 tion of the capital stock (obtained from BBV (2001)). The overall macroeconomic
scenario resulting from these choices is presented in table 4.
• Average retirement age (vi): The parameter controlling the relative value
of consumption and leisure is ﬁxed in such a way (σ=0.2) that the average retirement
age in the initial balanced growth path is as close as possible to the empirical value
(62.98 in 1978-1995, according to EPA data). The results obtained are shown in the
third column of table 3. Low-educated workers ﬁnd it optimal to early retire, while
all other workers wait till the normal retirement age. The crucial element forcing
low-income workers out of the labor force at the early retirement age is the minimum
pension scheme (fourth column of table 3). Overall, the endogenous behavior of the
agents in the model implies an average retirement age of 63.69, just a little higher
than the value observed in the data. Figure 4 compares the retirement hazard in
the model with its empirical counterpart. The model approximately reproduces the
stylized facts of retirement in Spain: the spikes at the early and normal retirement
ages and the pattern of early retirement of low income workers (low educational level
in the model), induced by a generous minimum pension scheme.
5 Findings
In this section we discuss the basic results obtained in the simulation of our calibrated
economy in a number of institutional environments. The benchmark model represents a
projection of how the system in eﬀect before 1997 would have evolved in absence of any
legislative reform. The results are presented in section 5.1. In section 5.2 we explore
the reforms implemented in 1997 and 2001 and propose two more ambitious strategies to
improve the prospects of the system.
5.1 Base simulation
The ﬁrst column of table 5 reproduces the parameters of the pension formula in the bench-
mark simulation. They are intended to reﬂect the institutional environment in place before
the recent legislative changes in Spain (second and third columns of table 5). The aggre-
gate performance of the benchmark economy is characterized by a progressive contraction
in the oﬀer of capital and labor, resulting in a reduction in the economy growth rate and a
mild process of capital deepening. Pension expenditure almost doubles between 2010 and
2045, under the eﬀect of the strong demographic changes described in section 4.1. This
leads to dramatic changes in the ﬁnancial condition of the pension system (illustrated in
ﬁgure 5). The initial decade is favorable (thanks to large immigration ﬂows), but the
condition of the system experiences a continuous deterioration thereafter. The initial sur-
plus vanishes by 2023, and the ensuing deﬁcit reaches a maximum equivalent to 10.7 %
of the aggregate product in 2048. To cope with this imbalance, the ﬁscal burden placed








 Base R97 R01 D=40 τN =6 8
Legal Retirement Ages:
Normal 65 65 65 65 68
Early 60 60 61 61 61
Cohorts entitled to Early retirement <1947 <1947 All All All
Pension formula:
Annual Penalty, α1 8% 7% 7 % 7 % 7%
Initial Replacement Rate, α0 0.6 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.51
Bonus for working after τN 0 0 2% 2% 2%
Averaging period, D 81 5 1 5 4 01 5
Table 5: Alternative institutional environments. Pension system parameters in our diﬀer-
ent simulations: base (pre 1997), 1997 reform (R97), 2001 Reform (R01), R01 + 40 years
in the formula’s averaging period (D=40) and R01 + delay in the normal retirement age
to 68 years (τN = 68).
imbalance in the interval 2000/2050 amounts to more than 3% of the GDP, and the size of
the total unfunded liabilities at the beginning of the simulation amounts to a 120% of the
aggregate output (ﬁrst column of table 6).19 According to our simulation results, then,
the ﬁnancial prospect of the pre-reformed system was severely compromised.
5.2 The reform of the Spanish pension system
We consider four variations to the institutional environment in our base simulation. We
explore ﬁrst the changes introduced in 1997, when the length of the averaging period D
was extended form 8 to 15 years and the annual early retirement penalty was slightly
reduced from 8 to 7%. In our simulations we refer to this new parametric scheme as R97
(second column in table 5), and assume that all changes in this and other reforms take
place from the beginning of the simulation. A second and considerably more signiﬁcant
collection of changes was implemented in 2001. Amid mild modiﬁcations in the pension
formula, the cornerstone of the reform was the extension of the early-retirement option to
all cohorts. Note that until 2001 only those cohorts who had made contributions before
1967 were entitled to claim the pension before the Normal age of 65. In compensation,
the new early retirement age was delayed by one year to 61. In our stylized model (see
under the R01-column in table 5), this 2001 reform materializes into a 2% bonus in the
19Our estimation of the system implicit liabilities is not diﬀerent from the already available ﬁgures for
the Spanish case (the equivalent ﬁgure in eg. Kalisch and Aman (1998) is 109%). To compute it we ﬁrst
calculate the net present value of all future expected pension payments and contributions for every cohort
alive at the beginning of the simulation (using a 5% discount factor). We then add up the ﬁgures, weighting


























Figure 5: Simulated time series of the pension system’s balance (aggregate contributions
minus pension expenditures) as a percentage of the aggregate output. Simulations: Base
(-), 1997 reform (·), 2001 reform (- -), extension of D to 40 (- · -) and delay of the normal
retirement age to 68 (thick -).
Base R97 R01 D=40 τN =6 8
Total IL/Y -118.42 -119.43 -127.12 -71.03 -65.19
Average PSB/Y -3.63 -3.71 -4.77 -0.50 -0.80
Minimum PSB/Y -10.67 -10.79 -12.17 -6.03 -6.96
Table 6: Pension system’s balance: summary statistics of the ﬁnancial condition in









 beneﬁt base for working beyond 65 and the adoption of 61 as the new early retirement
age, now available to all cohorts. Besides the already implemented reforms, we explore
two additional changes:
• A sharper generosity reduction, implemented through a further increase in the length
of the averaging period in the regulatory base. To grasp the maximum potencial of
this strategy we consider the inclusion of the full working career by rising D from
15 to 40 years. The institutional environment resulting after this parametric change
is denoted as D=40.
• A delay in the Normal retirement age. This implies changing the early retirement
penalties in such a way that individuals are awarded their full regulatory bases only at
the new Normal age. Trying to combine considerations of political feasibility with
our target to explore the maximum potential of reforms, we set the new Normal
age to 68. Note that the other parameters of the early retirement penalty are left
unchanged.20 We refer to this new pension system as τN = 68.
We next review the impact of these parametric changes in the ﬁnancial condition of
the pension system (recall ﬁgure 5), retirement behavior (ﬁgure 6) and life cycle welfare
by educational type (ﬁgures 7 to 9). Welfare changes are measured with a corrected
Equivalent Variation of life-cycle wealth.21
The 1997 reform
Increasing the averaging period D form 8 to 15 has small quantitative eﬀects on the size
of the pensions, and they tend to be of opposite sign depending on the educational type
(favorable for highly educated workers, unfavorable for the rest). These eﬀects are not
enough to change retirement decisions and largely cancel out in the aggregate. Overall,
the reform fails to achieve any improvement in the ﬁnancial soundness of the system: it
20Keeping α1 equal to 0.07 implies that α0 (the replacement rate in the early retirement age of 61)
should be reduce from 0.65 to 0.51. In this way, our delay of the normal retirement age also involves a
reduction in generosity for early retirees.
21We proceed in two steps. Firstly we compute the standard equivalente variation associated with every
reform, χ
r
u,j: the change in the life-cycle proﬁle of consumption (in the benchmark economy) that makes
the individual indiﬀerent between the benchmark and the reformed economies. This statistic is computed
for every educational type (j), cohort (u) and institutional environment (r). As these measures refer to the
speciﬁc consumption levels of heterogeneous individuals, they are not directly applicable for intra- or inter-
cohort comparisons. For this reason, we correct the measurements in a second step. As we work with a
homothetic utility function, the previous χ
r
u,j also represent percentage changes in individuals’ life-cycle
wealth. Consequently, we can convert them into objective wealth measures by multiplying them by the
expected present value (at the time of birth) of their labor endowment in the benchmark economy. To
achieve inter-generational comparability we conclude by normalizing the correction factors by the average
present value of labor endowment in 1995. Summing up, the reported ﬁgures are the percentage change
in the (1995-average of the) expected present value of labor endowment needed to make the individuals








 generates a small rise in the pension expenditure to output ratio and a hardly noticeable
upward shift in the time series of social security deﬁcit and taxes. The welfare changes are
also tiny: most cohorts of high income workers are slightly better oﬀ after the reform, as a
result of the higher pensions provided; all other individuals experience small welfare losses,
either as a result of lower pensions (average income workers), or as a result of the negative
macroeconomic impact of the reform (which reduces the minimum pensions enjoyed by
low income workers).
The 2001 reform
The most important change introduced in 2001 was the extension of the entitlement to
retire early to all cohorts, irrespectively of when they started to make contributions. Al-
though this is compensated to some extend by the one-year-increase in the early retirement
age, the overall eﬀect is a clear drop in the average retirement age (from 65 to 63.95 years
for cohorts born after 1947), as younger cohorts of low income workers beneﬁt from the
opportunity of leaving the labor force early. As minimum pensions make the early retirees
signiﬁcantly more expensive than the normal ones, this change in behavior pushes the
aggregate pension expenditure up. This is despite the very mild eﬀect of the reform on
pension beneﬁts (very similar to those generated by the 1997 reform). Note also that the
2% bonus provided to prolongue the working career over the age of 65 proves essentially
ineﬀective. Overall, this reform drives the pension system further away from ﬁnancial
balance, increasing the implicit liabilities at the beginning of the simulation by almost 8
percentage points. Finally, the welfare impact is almost uniformly negative, hitting future
cohorts of low income workers specially hard.
Extending the averaging period in the pension formula to 40 years
Accounting for most of the working career (40 years) when computing the initial pension
beneﬁt has strong direct and indirect eﬀects. Pensions available at the age of 65 for high
income workers are 20 to 25% lower than in the base case (depending on the cohort). The
optimal individual response to this change includes staying in the labor force till the age
of 70, and so collecting the 2% annual bonus provided after the legal retirement age. This
mitigates the impact of the reform but, still, this group ends up with lower pensions (6
to 9% lower than in the benchmark) which, combined with the longer working careers,
implies a substantial cut in their associated pension expenditure. Average income workers
also experience large reductions in beneﬁts (in the range 15/18%), but most cohorts still
ﬁnd it optimal to retire at 65 (cohorts born in the interval 1978/1988 are the exception,
delaying retirement by one additional year). In contrast, the unchanged minimum pension
scheme protects low income workers from any reduction in their eﬀective pensions. The
overall consequence is a substantial reduction in aggregate pension expenses, leading to
higher levels of personal savings and capital accumulation and big improvements in the






















Figure 6: Average retirement age by cohort in our sequence of economies: Base (-), 1997 reform
(·), 2001 reform (- -), extension of D to 40 (- · -) and delay of the normal retirement age to 68
(thick -)













Figure 7: Welfare change by cohort for highly educated workers. Corrected Equivalent Variation
associated with 1997 reform (·), 2001 reform (- -), extension of D to 40 (- · -) and delay of the






















Figure 8: Welfare change by cohort for average educated workers. Corrected Equivalent Variation
associated with 1997 reform (·), 2001 reform (- -), extension of D to 40 (- · -) and delay of the
normal retirement age to 68 (thick -)














Figure 9: Welfare change by cohort for low educated workers. Corrected Equivalent Variation
associated with 1997 reform (·), 2001 reform (- -), extension of D to 40 (- · -) and delay of the








 in the average deﬁcit of the system along the interval [2000,2050] (0.5% of GDP vs 3.6%
in the benchmark) and by a remarkable 40% reduction in the size of unfunded liabilities.
The welfare gains from the reforms are very unequally distributed. High income workers
are net losers of the reform, but there is substantial inter-cohort variation even within this
group. For individuals born after 1975, the lower taxes and higher labor income prevailing
under the new system more than compensate for the lower pensions and longer working
careers. A small number of cohorts of average income workers (those born before 1945)
are in a similar situation, although the extent of their losses is much smaller. Finally,
and in sharp contrast, all cohorts of low income workers enjoy important welfare gains.
According to our Equivalent Variation measure, the gains for cohorts born after the reform
are as high as 8% of the (1995 average of the) present value of life time resources.
Delaying the normal retirement age till 68
An alternative strategy to curb the increase in pension expenditures pursues delays in the
eﬀective retirement age (resulting in larger working careers, more life-cycle contribution
and less pension payments). In our simulations we explore the impact of making 68 the
new normal retirement age (the age when a 100% of the regulatory base is granted). We
ﬁnd this change very eﬀective: only low income workers stick to the practice of leaving
the labor force early, despite the new institutional environment. Everybody else prefer to
stay in the labor force till the new normal age, pushing the average retirement age up to
66.2 years. Average pensions also go down slightly (decreasing life-cycle earning proﬁles
result in lower pensions at 68 than at 65), producing additional savings for the pension
system. All in all, we observe reductions in the aggregate pension expenses of the same
order of magnitude than those created by ﬁxing D in 40 years. The distributional impact
is, however, considerably diﬀerent, as this reform treats the cohorts of current workers in
a signiﬁcantly less severe way. Still, senior workers in the high and average income groups
cannot escape suﬀering welfare losses after the reform.
6 Conclusions
This paper uses a calibrated OLG model to examine the impact of several parametric
reforms on the ﬁnancial sustainability of the Spanish PAYG pension system. We ﬁnd that
the changes introduced in 1997 and 2001 completely fail on this ground, as they actually
lead to larger pension liabilities. In contrast, extending the averaging period in the pension
formula to 40 years and delaying the Normal retirement age till 68 are eﬀective measures
to reduce the generosity of the system and to foster longer working careers. As a result,
both additional changes reduce the future imbalances of the pension system substantially,
although they are not enough to make them disappear. Our calculations also predict
important welfare gains stemming from sizable pension cuts, although there are strong
diﬀerences in the distribution of these gains within and across cohorts. A common feature








 aging to the current cohorts of workers, specially to their most senior members. Therefore,
they ﬁt nicely with the (far from uncontroversial) view that the cost of the Baby-Boomers
pensions should not be placed on the shoulders of future taxpayers. We also ﬁnd strong
intra-generational diﬀerences in the welfare impact of the application of the reforms. If,
as seems most plausible, the minimum pension scheme is not subject to parallel beneﬁt
reductions, it would eﬀectively protect low income workers from any short-run welfare loss
during the implementation of the reforms. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, according
to our simulations, delaying the legal retirement age is substantially less damaging for
current senior workers than direct pension reductions. We have tested the robustness of
the ﬁndings to changes in some of the simplifying assumptions in our model economy22.
We ﬁnish the paper by mentioning some posible extensions. Firstly, increases in the
female participation rates and reductions in unemployment rates could signiﬁcantly alle-
viate the condition of the system during the ﬁrst decades of the century. Extending large
scale OLG models to include these two features will improve the quality of their predic-
tions about the pension system’s levels. It is, however, a major challenge given our current
modeling and computing capabilities. Secondly, getting a more detailed reproduction of
the institutional environment is a less ambitious but also quite relevant improvement. In
particular, the consideration of survival pensions (typically in conjunction with gender
heterogeneity), the inclusion of the Self-employed Regime and the enrichment of the cur-
rent representation of the General Regime, will help to improve the calibration of the levels
of the system and the reproduction of the empirical retirement patterns. Finally it would
be important to account for the diﬀerences between natives and immigrants in dimensions
like income processes and fertility. As the share of the immigrants in total population is
going to experience a substantial hike in the future (it is already going up noticeably),
these diﬀerences are due to play a signiﬁcant role in the future evolution of the pension
system’s ﬁnancial condition.
22Changes in the ﬁscal system, the public expenditure policy, and the “close” economy assumption.
We have also conﬁrmed the importance of an endogenous retirement decision for a precise quantitative
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A-1 Formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium of the model
An equilibrium path o v e rt h et i m ei n t e r v a lT consists of the following objects:
• Population aggregates {Nt,Mt,Pt,Ft} and population distributions by age and ed-
ucation, µt
ij for all i ∈I ,j ∈J,t ∈T
• Assignments of consumption, savings and working hours {ct
ij,a t
ij, 1 − lt
ij} for all
cohorts alive in t ∈T and all education types j ∈J. 23
• Inputs employed by the competitive ﬁrms (Kt,L t) t ∈T
• A Public Policy {ϕt,bm t,CPt} t ∈T.
• A price system: {rt,wt} t ∈T
such that the following properties apply:
1. Endogenous population dynamics
Population aggregates and distributions are generated by equations (3) and (4),
given exogenous proﬁles for fertility, mortality and ﬂows of immigrants.
2. Individual Rationality.
Individual assignments are optimal given the price system and the public policy.
3. Factor markets’ clearance.
The capital and labor eﬀectively employed by ﬁrms come form the aggregation of
individual savings and labor supply:















r + δ =
∂F
∂K




23Note that the working hours depend on the retirement ages τ








 5. Balanced Public budget.
FIt(ϕt)+PSBt = CPt
where the ﬁscal income, FIt,a n dt h ei n c o m ef r o mb e q u e s t ,BIt, take the form:









the pension system’s balance is given by








where PPt stands for the aggregate pension expenditures.
6. Aggregate feasibility
Y t +( 1− δ)Kt + BIt = Kt+1 + BIt+1 +
J  
j=1
I  
i=20
Pt
ijct
ij+ CPt
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